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   Introduction.   This  White  Paper,   the   third   in   a   series  assessing   state   efforts   to  
take  over  federal  public  lands,1  addresses  state  claims  to  the  minerals  underlying  those  
lands.  Our  prior  papers  establish  the  disconnect  between  states’  legal  demands  for  title  
to  the  public  domain,  and  takeover  advocates’  sincerely  held  belief  that  states  would  be  
more  efficient  managers  —  the  latter  simply  provides  no  legal  basis  for  the  former.  Our  
prior  papers  also  demonstrate  that  it  is  a  well  established  matter  of  constitutional  law  that  
the   federal   government   retains   plenary   power   over   the   public   domain,   including   the  
power  to  retain  the  land  in  federal  ownership.  Furthermore,  a  successful  takeover  would  
raise  significant   fiscal  and  policy  challenges   for   the  states  while   reducing  opportunities  
for  public  involvement  in  land  management  decisions.    
   Using   Utah   as   an   example,   we   argue   here   that   even   if   states   overcome  
extremely   long   odds   to   convince   a   court   that   the   federal   government   is   obligated   to  
dispose  of  more  public  land,  and  that  such  a  disposal  obligation  necessitates  giving  the  
public   domain   to   the   states,   well   established   legal   principles   would   prevent   grants   of  
most   mineral   lands   to   the   states.   Moreover,   any   mineral   rights   that   states   did   obtain  
would  be  realized  only  after  years  of  costly  site-­specific  litigation  —  litigation  above  and  
beyond  that  required  to  test  the  validity  of  their  efforts  to  compel  disposal.    
   To   be   clear,   we   do   not   believe   that   the   federal   government   is   obligated   to  
dispose   of   public   land   beyond   the   almost   400  million   acres   of   land   surface   it   already  
gave   up   in   the   eleven   contiguous   Western   States.   We   also   question   whether,   if   a  
disposal  obligation  were   found  to  exist,   that   the  obligation  would  necessitate  giving   the  
land   away   or   would   require   giving   it   to   the   states.   This   paper   proceeds   under   these  
assumptions  only  for  purposes  of  argument,  and  to  demonstrate  that  even  a  successful  
takeover  bid  is  unlikely  to  produce  the  result  takeover  advocates  desire.    
   Our  conclusion  that  states  are  unlikely  to  obtain  significant  mineral  lands  follows  
from  two  key  facts:  First,  the  federal  government  reserved  mineral  lands  for  itself  at  the  
time  of  statehood,  when   it  expressly  granted   land   to  newly  minted  states.  While  we  do  
not  believe   that  additional   land  grants  are   required,   it   is  clear   that   the  express  mineral  
reservations  contained  in  other  land  grants  should  be  imputed  to  any  implied  promise  to  
dispose  of  additional  lands  recognized  under  any  transfer  theory.  This  reservation  would  
prevent  the  targeted  mineral  lands  from  transferring  to  the  states.  Second,  the  scope  of  
the   federal  mineral   reservation   is  based  on  knowledge  of   the   land’s  mineral  character,  
which   is   determined   when   both   the   transfer   obligation   takes   effect,   and   public   land  
surveys   are   complete.   However,   determining   the   date   upon   which   the   policy   favoring  
public  domain  disposal  purportedly  ripened  (and  transformed)  into  a  legally  enforceable  
obligation  to  grant  lands  to  the  states  is  not  easily  established.  Furthermore,  surveys  of  
much   of   the   West   remain   incomplete.   Absent   satisfaction   of   these   two   predicate  
conditions,  a  transfer  cannot  take  place.    
   Mineral   title   is   important   because  Utah’s   best  —   and   perhaps   only  —   hope   of  
covering   management   costs   involves   mineral   development. 2   Indeed,   during   2013,  
federal  mineral   leasing   (primarily  oil,   natural  gas,  and  coal)  produced  93-­percent  of  all  
revenue  derived  from  the  targeted  public  lands.3  Taking  on  the  management  of  millions  
of  acres  of  new  land  without  simultaneously  securing  a  source  of  funding  to  fulfill   those  
obligations  would  be  contrary  to  the  state’s  best  interests.  
  
   A   Summary   of   Utah’s   Claims   to   Public   Lands.   On  March   23,   2012,   Utah’s  
Governor  signed  into  law  the  Transfer  of  Public  Lands  Act  (TPLA).4  The  TPLA  demands  
that   the  United  States  extinguish   title   to  31.2  million  acres  of  public   lands  and   transfer  
title  to  those  lands  to  the  State.5  The  TPLA  and  it’s  progeny  proceed  on  the  theory  that  
the  federal  statutes  authorizing  states  to  join  the  Union  and  long-­standing  federal  policy  
obligate  the  federal  government  to  dispose  of  millions  of  acres  of  public  land.  The  United  
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States,   according   to   the   state,   breached   this   promise,   and   takeover   legislation   is   an  
attempt  to  force  the  federal  government  to  satisfy   its  disposal  obligation.6  The  Enabling  
Act  language  relied  upon  by  Utah  is  as  follows:    
  
That  the  people  inhabiting  said  proposed  State  do  agree  and  declare  that  
they  forever  disclaim  all  right  and  title  to  the  unappropriated  public   lands  
lying  within  the  boundaries  thereof;;  and  to  all  lands  lying  within  said  limits  
owned  or  held  by  any  Indian  or  Indian  tribes;;  and  that  until  the  title  thereto  
shall  have  been  extinguished  by  the  United  States,  the  same  shall  be  and  
remain  subject  to  the  disposition  of  the  United  States.7  
  
   According  to  the  state,   this  statutory   language  obligates  the  federal  government  
to   “extinguish”   title   to   unreserved  public   lands.  By   retaining   title   to  millions   of   acres  of  
National  Forest  and  BLM   lands,   the   federal  government  has   failed   to  extinguish   title   to  
the   public   domain,   and   thus   breached   its   obligation.   The   state   also   argues   that   the  
Enabling   Act’s   requirement   to   pay   Utah   five-­percent   of   the   net   proceeds   of   post-­
statehood  public  land  sales  demonstrate  an  obligation  to  sell  off  the  public  domain.8  The  
state  contends  that,  given  this  breach,  Utah’s  disclaimers  of  rights  to  additional  land  are  
inoperative.9    
   The  above-­noted  legal  infirmities  aside,  it  is  important  to  consider  precisely  what  
states  might  receive  were  they  to  prevail  in  their  claims  because  Utah  appears  intent  on  
pursuing  litigation,  appropriating  $2  million  for  litigation  planning,10  and  several  states  are  
lining  up  to  follow  in  Utah’s  footsteps.11  
  
   The   Federal   Government   Reserved   the   Minerals   Beneath   the   Public  
Domain.   The   1889   act   authorizing   Montana,   North   Dakota,   South   Dakota,   and  
Washington  State  to  join  the  Union  provides  that  “all  mineral  lands  shall  be  exempt  from  
the   grants   made   by   this   act.”12  Similar   provisions   apply   with   respect   to   Colorado,13  
Idaho, 14   Wyoming, 15   New   Mexico, 16   and   Arizona. 17   The   Utah   Enabling   Act,   like   the  
statehood   enabling   acts   for   California   and   Oregon,   did   not   include   an   explicit   federal  
mineral   reservation.  The  U.S.  Supreme  Court,   however,   long  ago  dispelled  any  notion  
that  Congress  intended  to  convey  mineral  lands  to  these  states.    
   Utah’s  right  to  mineral   lands  was  settled  almost  a  century  ago  in  a  dispute  over  
title  to  coal  land  in  aptly  named  Carbon  County.  The  defendant,  Mr.  Sweet,  obtained  title  
to   the  disputed   land  from  the  state,  which  claimed  title  via   the   land  grants  contained   in  
the  Utah  Enabling  Act.  The  Act,  according   to  Mr.  Sweet,  vested   title   to  minerals   in   the  
state   because   the   Act   did   not   expressly   reserve  minerals,   and   Congress   would   have  
reserved   the   minerals,   as   it   had   done   in   other   statehood   enabling   acts,   had   it   not  
intended  the  minerals  to  pass  to  the  state.18  The  United  States  countered  that  Congress  
had   a   well-­established   policy   of   reserving   minerals   when   it   disposed   of   the   public  
domain,  and   that   the  Utah  Enabling  Act  should  be   read   in   light  of   this  policy.  Because  
the  coal-­bearing  nature  of   the   land  was  known  prior   to  conveyance  to   the  state,   title   to  
those  lands  could  not  have  passed  through  the  state  to  Mr.  Sweet.19    
   The  Supreme  Court  sided  with  the  federal  government,  explaining  that:  
  
[T]he  school  grant  to  Utah  must  be  read  in  the  light  of  the  mining  laws,  the  
school  land  indemnity  law  and  the  settled  public  policy  respecting  mineral  
lands,  and  not  as  though  it  constituted  the  sole  evidence  of  the  legislative  
will.  When  it   is  so  read   it  does  not,   in  our  opinion,  disclose  a  purpose  to  
include   mineral   lands.   Although   couched   in   general   terms   adequate   to  
embrace   such   lands   if   there   were   no   statute   or   settled   policy   to   the  
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contrary,  it  contains  no  language  which  explicitly  or  clearly  withdraws  the  
designated   sections,   where   known   to   be  mineral   in   character,   from   the  
operation   of   the   mining   laws,   or   which   certainly   shows   that   Congress  
intended   to  depart   from   its   long  prevailing  policy  of  disposing  of  mineral  
lands  only  under  laws  specially  including  them.  It  therefore  must  be  taken  
as  neither  curtailing  those  laws  nor  departing  from  that  policy.20  
  
   Indeed,  Utah  officials  knew  of   the  “long  prevailing  policy  of  disposing  of  mineral  
lands  only  under  laws  specially  including  them”  well  before  the  Sweet  decision.  In  1880  
—  sixteen  years  before  Utah  became  a  state  —  California   lost  a  similar  bid   for   title   to  
mineral  lands  despite  the  absence  of  an  explicit  mineral  reservation  in  its  enabling  act.  In  
the   Ivanhoe   Mining   case,   the   Supreme   Court   held   that   “[m]ineral   lands   are,   by   the  
settled   policy   of   the   government,   excluded   from   all   grants;;   therefore   the   grant   .   .   .   of  
public   lands   to   the   state   of   California   for   school   purposes,   was   not   intended   to   cover  
mineral  lands.”21  Critically,  the  Ivanhoe  Mining  decision  held  that  the  implied  reservation  
applied  to  “all  grants,”  not  just  to  school  grants,  as  adjudicated  in  Sweet.    
   Furthermore,  in  1898,  the  General  Land  Office  (GLO,  the  precursor  agency  to  the  
BLM)  recognized  an  implied  reservation  of  minerals  in  section  eight  of  the  Utah  Enabling  
Act   that   precluded   grants   of   mineral   lands   for   universities.22  One   year   later   the   GLO  
recognized  an  implied  reservation  of  minerals  in  section  seven  of  the  Utah  Enabling  Act  
that   precluded   grants   of   coal   and   mineral   lands   as   part   of   the   grant   supporting  
construction  of  the  state  capitol.23  Four  years  later,  the  GLO  observed   that  “[i]t  is  settled  
law  that  a  grant  of  school   lands  to  a  State  [under  section  six  of   the  Utah  Enabling  Act]  
does  not  carry  lands  known  to  be  chiefly  valuable  for  mineral  [sic]  at  the  time  when  the  
State’s  right  would  attach,  if  at  all.”24    
   Thus,   both   the   referenced   U.S.   Supreme   Court   decisions   and   administrative  
actions   establish   a   rule   of   law:   that   a   reservation   of   lands  mineral   in   character   by   the  
United   States,   whether   express   or   implied,   extends   to   all   land   grants   to   the  Western  
States,   including  the  State  of  Utah.  The  same  reservation  of   lands  mineral   in  character  
should  be  applicable  as  well  to  any  remedial  transfer  of  public  lands  by  the  United  States  
to  Utah  stemming   from  a  purported  breach  of   the  Enabling  Act   for   failure   to  extinguish  
title   to  all   remaining  public   lands.  Otherwise,   transferring   lands  known   to  be  mineral   in  
character   to  Utah  under   the  TPLA  would   constitute   an  unsubstantiated  windfall   that   is  
contrary  to  an  established  legal  principle.  
   Despite  this  broad  federal  reservation  of  minerals,  some  mineral-­rich  public  lands  
did  pass  to  the  states.  During  the  2013-­14  fiscal  year,  the  Utah  School  and  Institutional  
Trust   Lands   Administration   generated   $103.8   million,   or   three-­quarters   of   its   total  
revenue,   from  mining   and   oil   and   natural   gas   development   on   formerly   federal   public  
lands   that   were   conveyed   to   Utah   pursuant   to   the   Utah   Enabling   Act. 25   These  
conveyances  occurred  for  two  reasons:  First,  because,  as  the  Sweet  decision  indicates,  
the  federal  reservation  of  minerals  applies  only  where  the  mineral  character  of  the  land  
is   known  when   the   grant   takes   effect.26  If   the   mineral   character   of   the   land   was   not  
known  at  the  time  of  conveyance,  “subsequent  discoveries  will  not  affect  the  patent”  and  
the  state  would  be  entitled  to  subsequently  discovered  minerals.27    
   Second,  because  the  Jones  Act,  passed  in  1927,28  released  to  the  states  grants  
of   numbered   school   sections   that   had   been   previously   withheld   because   of   mineral  
classification.  The  Jones  Act,  however,  applies  only  to  in-­place  numbered  section  grants  
supporting   public   schools. 29   Takeover   advocates   do   not   contend   that   the   federal  
government   failed   to  meet   its  obligation   to  dispose  of   in-­place  school  sections.  Rather,  
takeover   advocates   contend   that   the   federal   government   failed   to   dispose   of   sections  
other   than   those   specifically   identified   in   statehood   enabling   acts.   The   Jones   Act,  
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therefore,   does   not   help   takeover   proponents,   as   it   applies   only   to   in-­place   grants   in  
support  of  school  grants  and  not  to  the  broader  purported  duty  to  dispose  addressed  by  
the  TPLA  or  its  progeny.  
  
   Extent   of   the   Mineral   Reservation.   Assuming   that   takeover   advocates  
somehow  prevail  —  an  assumption  we  make  purely   for   the  sake  of  demonstrating   that  
their   victory   would   indeed   be   hollow   —   we   turn   to   the   scope   of   the   federal   mineral  
reservation.    
   Congress,   even   when   it   expressly   reserved   minerals   in   state   enabling   acts,  
neglected   to  define   the   term   “mineral.”  The   task  of  determining  what   substances  were  
reserved   to   the   federal   government   therefore   fell   to   administrative   agencies   and   the  
courts.30  For  their  part,  the  GLO  and  the  courts  defined  minerals  quite  broadly,  drawing  
little   distinction   between   the   definition   of  minerals   under   the   various   laws   dealing  with  
land   disposition   and   mineral   rights.31  Indeed,   the   Supreme   Court   holds   that   “mineral  
lands  include  not  merely  metalliferous  lands,  but  all  such  as  are  chiefly  valuable  for  their  
deposits  of  a  mineral  character,  which  are  useful  in  the  arts  or  valuable  for  purposes  of  
manufacture.”32    
   Once  what   constitutes  a  mineral   is  defined,   the  question  becomes  whether   the  
minerals  are  of  sufficient  quantity  and  quality  to  justify  classifying  the  lands  as  “mineral  in  
character.”   The   reservation   of   mineral   lands,   including   the   reservation   contained   in  
grants  to  states,  “are  not  held  to  exclude  all   lands  in  which  minerals  may  be  found,  but  
only   those   where   the   mineral   is   in   sufficient   quantity   to   add   to   their   richness,   and   to  
justify  expenditure   for   its  extraction.”33  A   leading   treatise  on  mining   law   in  effect  at   the  
time   of   the   Utah’s   admission   to   the   Union   summarizes   the   rules   for   determining   the  
mineral  character  of  land:    
  
The  mineral  character  of  the  land  is  established  when  it  is  shown  to  have  
upon   or   within   it   such   a   substance   as  —   (a)   Is   recognized   as  mineral,  
according  to  its  chemical  composition,  by  the  standard  authorities  on  the  
subject;;  or  (b)  Is  classified  as  a  mineral  product  in  trade  or  commerce;;  or  
(c)  Such  a  substance  (other  than  the  mere  surface  which  may  be  used  for  
agricultural   purposes)   as   possesses   economic   value   for   use   in   trade,  
manufacture,  the  sciences,  or  in  the  mechanical  or  ornamental  arts.34  
  
With  respect  to  coal  and  oil  bearing  lands,  mineral  classification  may  be  based  on  facts  
that   engender   a   reasonable   belief   that   the   lands   contain   minerals,   which   can   be  
established  by  inference  from  nearby  geologic  features.35    
   In   sum,   the   existence   of   a   potential   federal   reservation   depends   on   both   the  
nature  and  quantum  of  the  mineral  resource,  and  whether  the  value  of  those  resources  
outweighs   the   value   of   the   land   for   agricultural   purposes. 36   These   are   highly   fact  
intensive   and   site-­specific   questions   that   the   California   Supreme   Court   summarized  
nicely  151  years  ago  when  it  said:    
  
It   is  not  easy   in  all   cases   to  determine  whether  any  given  piece  of   land  
should   be   classed   as   mineral   lands   or   otherwise.   The   question   may  
depend  upon  many  circumstances  such  as  whether   it   is   located  in  those  
regions   generally   recognized   as  mineral   lands,   or   in   a   locality   ordinarily  
regarded  as  agricultural   in  its  character.  Lands  may  contain  the  precious  
metals,  but  not  in  sufficient  quantities  to  justify  working  them  as  mines,  or  
make   the   locality  generally  valuable   for  mining  purposes,  while   they  are  
well  adapted  to  agricultural  or  grazing  pursuits;;  or  they  may  be  but  poorly  
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adapted   to  agricultural  purposes,  but   rich   in  minerals;;  and   there  may  be  
every  gradation  between  the  two  extremes.  There  is,  however,  no  certain,  
well  defined,  obvious  boundary  between  the  mineral  lands  and  those  that  
cannot  be  classed  in  that  category.  Perhaps  the  true  criterion  would  be  to  
consider  whether  upon   the  whole   the   lands  appear   to  be  better  adapted  
to  mining  or  other  purposes.  However  that  may  be,  in  order  to  determine  
the  question,   it  would,  at  all  events,  be  necessary   to  know   the  condition  
and   circumstances   of   the   land   itself,   and   of   the   immediate   locality   in  
which  it  is  situated.37  
  
   Knowledge  of  coal,  oil,  and  natural  gas  formations  has  been  largely  established  
for   many   years,   but   knowledge   of   other   minerals   may   be   less   well   defined.   Where  
mineral  resources  are  known  to  exist  but  development  has  yet  to  occur,  the  question  of  
whether  the  lands  are  in  fact  mineral  in  character  will  need  resolution.  Hence,  any  state  
claim   to   potential  mineral   lands  will   necessitate   extensive   fact   finding  and   litigation   for  
each  parcel  claimed  by  the  state.  
  
   When  Did  the  Grant  Take  Effect?  One  of  the  most  vexing  questions  will  involve  
the  moment   in   time   at   which   knowledge   of  minerals,   and  with   them   the   extent   of   the  
reservation,  must  be  measured.  The  scope  of  the  federal  mineral  reservation  is  defined  
at  the  moment  in  time  when  the  grant  of  land  would  otherwise  take  effect  and  surveys  of  
the  land  are  completed.  
   Identifying  the  point   in  time  at  which  the  alleged  promise  of  public   land  disposal  
ripened   into  an  enforceable  disposal  obligation  will  be  a  critically   important   task.38  That  
moment   in   time,   however,   is   impossible   to   identify.   The   alleged   obligation   takeover  
advocates  assert  was  never  stated  explicitly   in  statute,  but   rather,  was  part  of  a  broad  
and   evolving   federal   land   tenure   policy.39  Statehood   enabling   acts,   while   purportedly  
embodying  the  promise  of  disposal,  do  not  state  when  additional  disposal  was  to  occur,  
if  it  was  to  occur  at  all.    
   The  most  obvious  explanation  is  that  the  federal  government  retained  discretion  
to   decide  whether   to   dispose   the   land   and   never   intended   to   assume   further   disposal  
obligations.40  Setting   this   explanation   aside,   we   are   left   with   what   TPLA   proponents  
characterize   as   a   quasi-­contract,   but   without   an   essential   term.   The   absence   of   an  
essential   term   could   prove   fatal   to   TPLA-­based   claims   because,   as   explained   in   the  
preeminent   treatise   on   contract   law,   “[v]agueness   of   expression,   indefiniteness   and  
uncertainty  as   to  any  of   the  essential   terms  of  an  agreement,  have  often  been  held   to  
prevent  the  creation  of  an  enforceable  contract.”41    
   To  avoid   this  outcome   transfer  proponents  will   likely  argue   that   “time   is  neither  
unlimited  nor  discretionary  .  .  .  and  the  promised  performance  must  be  rendered  within  a  
‘reasonable   time.’”42   “Reasonable   time”   could   be   construed   as   after   fulfillment   of   all  
conditions  precedent.  Under  this  approach,  the  boundaries  of  the  lands  at  issue  and  the  
rights   reserved   to   the   federal   government   can   be   determined   only   after   the   land   is  
surveyed.  But  roughly  thirty  percent  or  more  of  Nevada  and  Utah  has  yet  to  be  surveyed  
(see   next   section),  meaning   that   unsurveyed   portions   of   the   public   domain   cannot   be  
transferred   out   of   federal   ownership.   Even   where   surveys   are   complete,   the   federal  
government   should   be   afforded   a   reasonable   period   following   survey   completion   to  
determine   how   best   to   dispose   of   the   land   in   question   (e.g.,   public   auctions,   over   the  
counter   sales,   grants   to   states,   or   via   some   other   method).   There   is   little   if   any  
information  with  which   to  bound  a   “reasonable”  post-­survey   time  period,  but  given   that  
Utah   is  asserting  a  claim  to  31.2  million  acres  of   land,  a   reasonable   time  period  would  
presumably  extend  for  several  years.    
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   Another  option  would  be  setting  the  time  of  performance  for  disposal  of  the  public  
domain  to  coincide  with  enactment  of   the  Federal  Land  Policy  and  Management  Act  of  
1976  (FLPMA).43  FLPMA  announced  as  national  policy  that  “the  public  lands  be  retained  
in  Federal  ownership,  unless  .  .  .  it  is  determined  that  disposal  of  a  particular  parcel  will  
serve  the  national  interest.”44  FLPMA,  because  of  its  codification  of  retention  policies,  is  
often   identified   as   ending   the   era   of   public   land   disposal   and   could   conceivably   be  
regarded  as   the  date  upon  which   the   federal  government   refused   to  honor   its  disposal  
obligation.  The   refusal   could   therefore  mark   the  date  of   the  breach  even   if   the   time  of  
performance  remains  uncertain.  Setting  the  date  of  the  breach  to  coincide  with  FLPMA’s  
enactment   would   reserve   to   the   federal   government   all   lands   that   were   known   to   be  
mineral   in   character   as   of   1976   (or   later   where   public   land   surveys   remained  
incomplete).  By  then,  though,  most  valuable  minerals  were  likely  identified  with  sufficient  
certainty   to   be   included   in   a   federal   mineral   reservation,   thereby   precluding   their  
conveyance  to  the  states.    
   Or,   the   alleged   obligation   to   dispose   of   the   public   domain  may   arguably   have  
occurred  only   after  Utah  demanded  performance  and   the   federal   government   refused.  
Because   the  TPLA  gave   the  United  States  until  December  31,  2014,   to  dispose  of   the  
public   lands   within   Utah,45  the   resources   subject   to   disposal   under   this   interpretation  
would   be   defined   no   earlier   than   that   date.   Under   this   approach,   even   more   mineral  
lands   would   likely   have   been   identified,   leaving   the   state   with   little   in   terms   of   new  
mineral  wealth.  With  few  minerals  lands  eligible  for  conveyance  to  the  state,  Utah  would  
have   limited   access   to   the   revenue   needed   to   support   management   of   the   acquired  
lands.  If  performance  is  tied  to  state  demand  statutes,  states  following  Utah’s  lead  would  
fare  even  worse,  as  their  demands  would  be  based  on  even  later  effective  dates.    
   Finally,  there  is  the  problem  of  formulating  a  judicial  remedy.  The  remedy  issues  
are  extensive  and   complex:  Courts  would  need   to   resolve  how  much  additional   public  
land  must   be   disposed   of,   who  would   decide   what   lands   would   be   disposed   of,   what  
standards   they   would   apply   in  making   that   determination,   to   whom   the   land  would   or  
could  be   conveyed   to   (e.g.   states,   individuals,   or   corporations),   the  means  of   disposal  
(e.g.  grants  or  sales,   in   fee  or  while  reserving  minerals),   the  deadline   for  disposal,  and  
the   list  goes  on.  The  cost  of   this   litigation  would  be  borne  by   the  state  before   transfer  
could  occur  and  without  any  guarantee  of  a  favorable  outcome.    
  
   Survey   Completion.   One   additional   fatal   flaw   stands   in   the   way   of   takeover  
advocates’  dreams  of  wholesale  public  land  transfers  —  the  absence  of  the  land  surveys  
needed  in  advance  of  conveyance.  The  public  land  survey  system  divides  the  landscape  
into  townships,  each  of  which  contains  thirty-­six  sections.  Each  section   is  normally  one  
square-­mile   in   size   (640   acres).46  Utah’s  Enabling  Act   grants   included   four   sections   in  
every   township   within   the   state.47  The   enabling   acts   for   other  Western   States   contain  
similar   provisions,   though  most  Western  States   received   less   land   than  Utah.48  Where  
these  “in  place”  grants  were  subject  to  prior  sales,  grants,  or  reservations,  states  had  the  
right  to  select  “in-­lieu”  lands.  States  were  also  granted  so-­called  “quantity  grants,”  which  
included  a  specified  number  of  acres  that  the  state  could  select  from  the  surveyed  public  
domain.49  
   Conveyance  of  these  lands  to  the  states  depended  on  completion  of  public  land  
surveys   because   the   boundary   of   lands   to   be   conveyed   could   not   be   marked   on   the  
ground  or  defined  with  adequate  legal  precision  in  conveyance  documents  until  township  
and  section  lines  were  surveyed  and  the  appropriate  parcel  boundaries  defined.50  Where  
surveys  were  completed  prior  to  states  joining  the  Union,  the  effective  date  of  the  grants  





[T]itle   to   unsurveyed   sections   of   the   public   lands   which   have   been  
designated  as  school  lands  does  not  pass  to  the  State  upon  its  admission  
into   the  Union,   but   remains   in   the  Federal  Government   until   the   land   is  
surveyed.  Prior  to  survey,  those  sections  are  a  part  of  the  public  lands  of  
the   United   States   and   may   be   disposed   of   by   the   Government   in   any  
manner  and  for  any  purpose  consistent  with  applicable  federal  statutes.  .  .  
.  The  interest  of  the  State  vests  at  the  date  of  its  admission  into  the  Union  
only   as   to   those   sections   which   are   surveyed   at   that   time   and   which  
previously  have  not  been  disposed  of  by  the  Federal  Government.52  
  
The  Court  went  on  to  express  its  reluctance  at  upsetting  this  well-­established  rule,  noting  
specifically   that   many   prior   decisions   rest   on   its   application,   and   a   departure   could  
produce  unequal  outcomes  among  the  several  states.53  
   The  Wyoming  decision,  however,  addressed  in  place  school  section  grants,  and  
Utah   is  not  demanding   title   to   in  place  school  sections   (which   it  has  already  received).  
Rather,  Utah   is   seeking   title   to   some   ill-­defined  other   suite   of   public   lands.  Whether   a  
court  would   apply   the  Wyoming   reasoning   in   the   context   of   TPLA-­based   claims   is   not  
clear.  The  policy  underpinnings  appear   to  be   the  same,  particularly  with   respect   to   the  
need  for  pre-­disposal  surveys,  suggesting  a  similar  holding.  But  given  the  import  of  the  
question,  it  should  be  assumed  that  this  issue  too  would  be  hotly  contested.    
   Despite   ongoing   efforts   to   survey   the   West, 54  millions   of   acres   of   the   public  
domain  have  never  been  surveyed.  In  Nevada,  for  example,  approximately  thirty-­percent  
of  the  state  remains  unsurveyed.55  Maps  depicting  the  condition  of  surveys  in  Utah  were  
completed   during   2008-­09,   and   indicate   that   roughly   one-­third   of   the   state   has   never  
been   surveyed. 56   Notably,   school   trust   land   sections   have   been   surveyed,   but  
surrounding   federal   lands   often   have   not.   Figure   1   provides   an   example   showing   the  
condition   of   surveys   for   the   BLM’s   Monticello,   Utah   Field   Office.   In   general,   the  
southeastern  portion  of  Utah  has  more  unsurveyed  land  than  other  portions  of  the  state,  
perhaps  because  of  the  region’s  rugged  topography.  It  appears  that  the  lands  most  likely  
to   contain   accessible  minerals  were   surveyed   first   and   that   the   remaining   unsurveyed  
lands   have   either   little   known   mineral   value,   or   that   the   unsurveyed   lands   would   be  
prohibitively   expensive   to   develop   because   of   rugged   topography   or   limited   access   to  
markets.    
  




Condition  of  Survey,  BLM’s  Monticello,  Utah  Field  Office  (2009)  
  
   Conclusion.   Improving   the   condition   and   management   of   our   nation’s   public  
lands   is  a   laudable  goal,  even   if  we  may  disagree  about  how  best   to  achieve  that  end.  
That   said,   there   is   a   fundamental   disconnect   between  assertions   that   states  would  be  
better  managers,  and  demands  that  the  federal  government  surrender  title  to  the  public  
domain.  Moreover,  states  have  extremely  weak  legal  claims  to  compel  additional  public  
land  disposal,  disposal  would  not  necessarily  require  grants  to  the  states,  and  even  if  the  
states  somehow  were  to  prevail  in  takeover  litigation,  “success”  would  inevitably  prompt  
decades  of  additional  litigation.    
   The   first   round   of   post-­TPLA   litigation   would   need   to   address   how   much  
additional   public   land   must   be   disposed   of,   who   would   decide   what   lands   would   be  
disposed  of,  what  standards  they  would  apply  in  making  that  determination,  to  whom  the  
land  would  or  could  be  conveyed  to,  whether  lands  should  be  sold  to  the  highest  bidder  
or  granted  to  deserving  parties,  whether  mineral  rights  would  be  reserved  to  the  federal  
government,  and  the  deadline  for  effectuating  disposal.    
   Once   these  preliminary  questions  were   resolved,  courts  would  need   to  address  
at   least  five  questions  involving  mineral  rights  for  each  parcel  of   land  at   issue.  The  first  
question  would  involve  the  point  in  time  at  which  the  federal  government  was  obligated  
to  dispose  of  the  remainder  of  the  public  domain.  The  second  question  would  involve  the  
existence   and   adequacy   of   cadastral   surveys   of   the   public   lands.   The   third   question  
would  involve  what  was  known  about  minerals  on  or  beneath  each  parcel  of  land  subject  
to   a   disposal   obligation   at   the   point   in   time   when   surveys   were   completed   and   the  
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whether,  based  on  this  information,  the  land  should  be  classified  as  mineral  in  character,  
thereby   defeating   the   state’s   claims   to   land   title.   The   final   question   would   involve  
whether   lands  were  otherwise   reserved  by   the   federal  government  or   conveyed  out  of  
public   ownership   (in   whole   or   with   respect   to   individual   mineral   interests)   before   the  
disposal  obligation  became  legally  enforceable.    
   All   five   of   these   questions   involve  matters   specific   to   each   individual   parcel   of  
land.  Given  the  fact-­intensive  nature  of  these  claims  and  Utah’s  demand  for  title  to  31.2  
million  acres  of   land,   these  claims  would   likely   take  decades   to   resolve.  Such   litigation  
would  involve  significant  costs  and  greatly  delay  the  states’  efforts  to  secure  title.  These  
costs,  moreover,  would  accrue  to  the  states  before  they  could  obtain  any  new  revenue  
from  the  targeted  lands,  and  without  any  guarantee  of  a  favorable  judicial  outcome.    
   Given  the   likely  extent  of   the  federal  mineral   reservation,   it  appears   that  even   if  
Utah   or   her   sister   states   were   to   somehow   prevail   in   TPLA   litigation,   the   states   are  
unlikely   to  secure   title   to  significant  new  mineral   resources.  Securing  public   lands  with  
limited   revenue   generating   potential   would   burden   states   with   all   of   the   costs   of  
management  without  providing  significant  additional  revenue  to  cover  those  expenses.  It  
is   ironic   that   in   1932,   Congress   considered   conveying   ownership   of   the   vacant,  
unappropriated,   and   unreserved   non-­mineral   public   lands   to   the   states.57  The   states  
opposed  the  proposal,   fearing  that  without  control  of   the  minerals   they  could  not  afford  
the   expense   of   management.58  Yet   today,   TPLA   advocates   are   rushing   towards   the  
same   financial   cliff,   either   unaware   of   the   likely   consequences   or   unwilling   to  
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